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16 April 1975

DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING

MONITORING A SALT AGREEMENT

- I. With respect to monitoring Soviet compliance with a SALT TWO agreement, let me first say that any remarks are preliminary. Any final assessment of our capabilities will of course depend on the substantive provisions of the agreement, as well as other measures designed to aid verification.
  - A. However, I believe the Soviets do not have a strong incentive to violate the terms of a SALT TWO Agreement by deploying more than the allowed number of strategic delivery vehicles or MIRVed missiles. There are several reasons for this belief:
    1. A large scale and militarily significant cheating effort would carry with it a high risk of detection. The Soviet leadership would almost surely conclude that the political

MON - 1

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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risks and the prospects of stimulating US counter-measures would outweigh the gains.

2. Cheating at more modest levels, with less risk of detection, would not be visible enough to provide any political leverage, and would not significantly increase Soviet strategic capabilities.

B. Nevertheless, we are concentrating our efforts to ensure that we will be able to monitor the proposed agreement. We do not expect the SALT TWO era to be troublefree from a monitoring viewpoint, and I feel sure we will still have to contend with ambiguities and suspicious activities similar to those I have already discussed.

#### Monitoring Capabilities

II. Under a SALT TWO agreement, monitoring will involve, at times, precise counting -- and at other times subjective estimates, using all available intelligence sources. We have high confidence in our ability to monitor the ag-

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
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gregate number of ICBM launchers at fixed sites,  
SLBMs, and bombers for intercontinental attack.



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C. Again, we believe we can monitor with high  
confidence the number of bombers in the USSR,  
and differentiate them by type. We are less

MON - 3

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sure that we can determine precisely the range, weapon loading, flight characteristics and mission of each aircraft type.

1. As I mentioned earlier, the Intelligence Community still has problems in determining all of the performance characteristics and mission for the new Soviet bomber, the Backfire.

#### Monitoring Problems

III. There are two potential problems in monitoring an aggregate limitation -- mobile ICBMs and long range air-launched missiles. I say "potential" because the Soviets do not have a long range air-launched missile under development, and we believe they have not yet deployed a mobile ICBM.

A. Depending on the way the Soviets deploy mobile ICBMs -- if they do -- monitoring the number of launchers deployed could be difficult.

1. If there are no concealment measures beyond those we would expect in any deployment effort for mobile missiles, we probably could recognize mobile ICBM deploy-

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ments within a year. By that time the Soviets could have deployed 25 to 100 launchers. After 200 launchers were deployed we probably could estimate the extent of deployment within about 100.


2. With larger deployments, we might still have to consider that as many as 100 launchers might remain undetected. Over time, however, this number might decrease, since our opportunities to identify characteristic deployment signatures would probably increase.
3. Our monitoring problems may be compounded if the Soviets deploy the SS-X-20 IRBM in a mobile configuration. I pointed out earlier that this missile is a two-stage derivative of the SS-X-16 ICBM, and apparently uses some of the same support equipment. Consequently, it may be difficult to distinguish between the two missiles when deployed.
4. We have, however, been able to gather

MON - 5


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C. Monitoring long range ASMs -- either cruise  
or ballistic -- also presents some potential  
problems. For example, it often is difficult

MON - 6

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25X1X5

25X1X5

25X1X5

[REDACTED] We  
probably could estimate how many ASMs each

aircraft could carry, but -- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
we could have difficulty in determining the  
number of aircraft actually equipped with such  
missiles.

- D. The freedom-to-mix feature adds yet another dimension to the problem. It requires that we maintain a detailed accounting of Soviet forces and monitor replacement of old weapon systems by new ones with perhaps entirely different characteristics.

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
MON - 7

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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MON - 8

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100120020-0



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Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100120020-0

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Constraints

V. Next, I wish to discuss some of the provisions which, if included in the agreement, would help our monitoring capabilities. Some special measures have been proposed in the US draft agreement to assist in monitoring and to help reduce or resolve some of the potential ambiguities which could arise. These include:

- Certain counting rules that establish which

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VI. Finally, Mr. Chairman, our assessment of the US capability to monitor Soviet compliance with the provisions of a SALT TWO agreement is presently somewhat uncertain for three reasons. First, our monitoring necessarily involves some estimating, second, we do not know what deployment and operating practices the Soviets will employ in the future, and third, the final form of the agreement, particularly its monitoring provisions, is still under negotiation.

A. I think it fair to say that the greater complexity, longer duration, and qualitative limitations of the new agreement will introduce more uncertainties into monitoring than the Interim Agreement did.

MON - 10

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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B. However, with the improvements we plan in our technical collection systems, along with agreed measures to assist monitoring such as those the US has proposed or acceptable substitutes for them, I believe the Intelligence Community will be able to monitor Soviet compliance with sufficient precision to protect our national security under the new agreement.

MON - 11

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